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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JEFFREY SCOTT, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 880182-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of 
Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), and one count of Theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant lacks standing to challenge the 
search of the briefcase and the seizure of the stolen jewelry? 
2. Whether the trial court properly found that 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk and 
briefcase? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const., amend. IVi 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Const., art. I S 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jeffrey Scott, was charged with two counts 
of Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978), and one count of Theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 1-
6). Defendant was convicted as charged after a jury trial held 
on February 23 through 29, 1988 in the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Weber County, the Honorable Judge Ronald 0. 
Hyde, Judge, presiding (R. 159-61). Defendant was sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison for two terms of zero to five years on the 
burglary charges and to one term of one to fifteen years on the 
theft charge. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 5, 1987, at about 9:20 p.m., the burglar 
alarm was triggered at Farr's Jewelry Store located in Ogden, 
Utah (T. 10). An investigation revealed that the jewelry store 
had been burglarized and that over $40,000 worth of rings, 
Because the transcripts lack appellate record numbers, the 
trial record will be referred to as "RM; the trial transcript as 
WT W; and the suppression hearing transcript as "S.T." 
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watches, loose diamonds, necklaces and other jewelry had been 
stolen (T. 254). 
Later that evening, defendant, Jeffrey Scott, departed 
from the Ogden area to travel to the State of California in a 
Ford Escort automobile with two other persons, Shawn Bell and 
Robert Sattiewhite (T. 94-95). Steven Farmer, the owner of the 
vehicle, did not accompany the group to California (T. 258). 
Nathanial Holstin, Sunday Farmer, and Lucy Turner followed 
defendant in a brown Cadillac automobile with a "Dusty's" sticker 
in the back window (T. 95). Holstin owned the Cadillac (T. 156). 
On the way to California, Shawn Bell overheard 
defendant tell Sattiewhite that he went into the wrong area and 
set off the alarm (T. 96). She also overheard defendant and 
Sattiewhite discuss numbers like 50,000 and 20,000 and overheard 
defendant indicate he had put in a hard nights work (T. 97-98). 
The next day on December 6, 1987, a confidential 
informant notified the police with information that Robert 
Sattiewhite and an unknown black male driving a brown Cadillac 
with a "Dusty's" sticker in the back window were involved in the 
Farr's burglary (T. 601). The confidential informant also 
informed the police that the two suspects were on their way to 
California (T. 602). 
On the same day near Barstow, California, California 
Highway Patrol Officer Curtis Nester stopped the Escort and 
Cadillac for speeding at approximately 93 miles per hour (T. 
153). As Officer Nester approached the Escort, Bell saw 
defendant put a little bag inside of his pants (T. 100). 
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Defendant had an open beer bottle between his legs when the 
officer arrived at the car (T. 158). The officer asked 
defendant, who was driving, for his driver's license and car 
registration (T 155). Defendant failed to produce any personal 
identification or car registration. Id. 
After obtaining the registration for the Cadillac, the 
officer again approached defendant and asked him to exit the 
Escort (T. 156). When he asked defendant his name, defendant 
gave the name of Jeffrey Boyd (T. 157). The officer proceeded to 
the passenger side of the Escort and asked Bell, who was sitting 
in the front passenger seat, what was defendant's name (P. 157). 
Bell told the officer that defendant's real name was Jeffrey 
Scott (T. 101, 157). Defendant then admitted to the officer that 
he had given a false name and produced a travel pass issued by 
the California Parole Board to Jeffrey Scott. Ici. Defendant was 
evasive to the officer about the details of his destination and 
purpose for traveling to California (T. 158). 
Sattiewhite and Bell exited the Escort and the officer 
searched the interior of the car for other open beer bottles (T. 
158) Officer Nester then asked defendant for permission to 
search the trunk (S.T. 79, 84, 91. T. 159). Defendant replied, 
"sure, go ahead, you can look in the trunk", and defendant 
secured the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk (S.T. 97. 
T. 160). The search of the trunk revealed a brown leather 
briefcase which all the vehicle occupants denied any knowledge or 
ownership of. (S.T. 79-80, 98. T. 102-03, 161). The officer 
then asked defendant for consent to open the briefcase to which 
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defendant again consented (S.T. 98-99, 104, 109. T. 102-03, 161). 
The briefcase was dicovered to contain a large amount of jewelry 
(T. 103, 161). The vehicle occupants, including defendant, 
denied any interest in the jewelry (T. 104, 161). Some of the 
jewelry had tags and/or inscriptions which indicated that the 
jewelry was from the "Farr's Jewlery Store." (T. 165). 
At this time, Sergeant James Pitsor arrived at the 
scene (T. 199). Officer Nester told Sergeant Pitsor that he had 
discovered a large quantity of jewelry pursuant to a consent 
search (T. 199). Pitsor received a radio dispatch from Odgen 
that confirmed a burglary at Farr's Jewelry Store and that a 
brown Cadillac was involved in the robbery (T. 163, 202). A 
consent form was then filled out to search the Cadillac (S.T. 
46). All six suspects were arrested in California and extradited 
to Utah (T. 125-26). 
On February 12, 1987, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence claiming lack of consent for the search (R. 
48-58). At the suppression hearing, Officer Nester testified 
that the defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of the 
trunk and briefcase (S.T. 22-3, 39-41). Lucy Turner testified 
that she heard the officer ask defendant if he could look in the 
trunk (S.T. 84). Although she could not verify that defendant 
was the person who gave consent, she testified that she heard 
someone consent to the search and that defendant never objected 
to it (S.T. 79, 84-85, 91-92). Shawn Bell testified that when 
the officer asked defendant if he could look in the briefcase, 
defendant consented (S.T. 98-99, 104, 106, 109). Defendant 
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testified that he owned the briefcase and that he had objected to 
the search by the officer (S.T. 6, 8). Judge Hyde denied 
defendant's suppression motion three grounds; that defendant had 
voluntarily consented to the search, that probable cause for the 
search had been established, and that the defendant lacked 
standing to contest the search. (Transcript of Closing Arguments 
dated February 22, 1988 at p. 14). 
Onan Ford, defendant's cellmate in the Weber County 
Jail, confidentially informed the police that defendant had 
admitted committing the Farr's burglary with Robert Sattiewhite 
and that Sattiewhite had tripped the alarm (T. 377-78). Ford 
also stated that defendant was hiding diamonds in his mattress in 
the jail cell and that the diamonds were from the Farr's burglary 
(T. 379-80). Apparently, defendant had concealed the diamonds 
from the police by hiding them in his "crotch" (T. 379). Based 
on this information, a search warrant was obtained for 
defendant's cell at the Weber County Jail on February 19, 1988 
(R. 112). The search revealed 14 diamonds hidden in defendant's 
mattress (R. 115-16). 
At trial, a footprint taken from the scene of the crime 
was positively identified as that of defendant's (P. 473). 
Robert Sattiewhite, who pled guilty to the Farr's burglary, 
testified that defendant had been his accomplice in the Farr's 
burglary (T. 535). 
Based on the evidence, defendant was convicted by a 
jury of the theft and burglary (R. 143-450.) Defendant now 
appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained pursuant to the search of the trunk and the briefcase. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant lacks standing to protest the search of the 
briefcase and seizure of the stolen jewelry because defendant 
neither owned the car he was driving nor demonstrated a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents. 
The trial court properly found that the search was 
validly based on defendant's voluntary consent. Such a finding 
should only be set aside when it is against the clear weight of 
evidence, or if the court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. Where there is 
substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding of 
voluntary consent, this Court should not disturb the trial 
court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEARCH OF THE BRIEFCASE AND THE SEIZURE OF 
THE STOLEN JEWELRY. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred 
in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the 
search of the trunk and briefcase. Defendant's claim should be 
rejected because he lacks standing to challenge the search of the 
trunk or briefcase and subsequent seizure of the stolen jewelry. 
Because defendant limits his standing argument to the 
federal constitution, the State's response will be confined to 
the federal Constitution. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973, 
n. 1 (Utah App. 1988). 
In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the United 
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States Supreme Court addressed the question of standing to 
protest an alleged unlawful search. In Rakas, the Court 
articulated the rule that a defendant has standing to challenge a 
search if defendant can establish "a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place." Jd. at 143. The Court rejected 
the earlier standard of "legitimately on the premises" as set 
forth in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) and held 
that fourth amendment rights are personal and do not extend to 
the search of another's premises or property, ^d. at 133. Thus, 
a defendant "who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property 
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy" 
in the property. Jd. at 144 n.12. But, a defendant who asserts 
neither a property nor a possessory interest in an item, nor an 
interest in the property seized, has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy and thus lacks standing, Ijd. at 148. Further, "[t]he 
proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing 
that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 
challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. 131 n.l. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and applied the 
Rakas standing rule. In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984), the use of evidence obtained from a vehicle which the 
defendant was driving was challenged under both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. The search was upheld because 
"[d]efendant concede[d] that he did not own the car or the 
attache case [found in the trunk] containing the evidence 
complained of, and [thus] failed to show that he had any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects searched." Id. 
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at 1335. 
More recently, in State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 
126-27 (Utah 1987), the Court held that the evidence obtained 
pursuant to a warrantless search of a vehicle was admissible 
since 
[d]efendant presented no testimony that he 
had driven the car with the permission of the 
owner that he had borrowed the car under 
circumstances that would imply permissive 
use. Absent claimed right to possession, he 
could not assert any expectation of privacy 
in the items seized and had no standing to 
object to the search. 
This Court has also applied the Rakas standing rule in 
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987), where a California 
resident was driving a vehicle registered to a New York resident. 
The driver gave consent to search the vehicle and the officer 
found a secret compartment in the trunk which held cocaine. The 
defendant in that case denied any knowledge of the compartment 
and its contents and presented no evidence at the suppression 
hearing of his permission to possess the vehicle. In DeAlo, as 
in the present case, 
[Djefendant denied any ownership in the car 
and any knowledge of the secret compartment 
or its illegal contents. The only 
substantive evidence defendant presented at 
the suppression hearing was the testimony of 
the arresting officer that it was his 
understanding Rafael Villa was using the car 
with his brother's permission. No other 
witnesses were called and no other evidence 
was presented. It might be argued the 
officer's testimony established some 
expectation of privacy on the part of Villa. 
That certainly does not establish an 
expectation of privacy on the part of 
defendant. 
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Id. at 196. This Court held that the defendant may have had an 
expectation of privacy in this own personal belongings in the 
vehicle, but not in the vehicle itself. The defendant had not 
shown "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the 
cocaine was found. Therefore, he had no standing to object to 
the search...." J^ i. at 197. 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that defendant did 
not own the vehicle he was driving (S.T. 4). Moreover, at the 
suppression hearing, defendant presented no evidence of his right 
to use the vehicle. Although defendant did testify that he had 
permission to be in the vehicle, the fact that the defendant may 
have been "legitimately on [the] premises" in that he may have 
been in the vehicle with the owner's permission does not 
determine whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the particular area of the automobile searched. Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. at 148. 
The only material difference between the facts in Rakas 
and the facts in the present case is that here the defendant was 
the driver of the vehicle rather than a passenger. The 
defendant's temporary status as the driver, without more, 
entitles him to no greater expectation of privacy as to the 
contents of the vehicle than that of the defendant in Rakas. 
State v. Emery, 41 Or.App. 35, 597 P.2d 375, 376 (1979). See 
also, People v. Flowers, 111 Ill.App.3d 348, 67 111.Dec. 203, 444 
N.E.2d 242, 246 (1982)(nonowner driver had no different status 
relative to the vehicle and its contents than did the defendant 
in Rakas); United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 695 (1st Cir. 
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1982)(defendant's expectation of privacy based on the fact that 
he was driving the car when stopped was insufficient to establish 
a privacy expectation). 
Defendant attempts to establish an expectation of 
privacy in the briefcase by recanting his earlier disclaimer of 
ownership (S.T. 4. 8). However, for a defendant to have standing 
to make a Fourth Amendment claim, a defendant must not disclaim 
ownership of the searched item at the time of the search. In 
Rakas, Valdez, Constantino, and DeAlo, each search was upheld 
because it was clearly established and undisputed prior to the 
search that the defendant did not own nor have an interest in the 
property searched. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found it to be a "specious" 
argument for a criminal defendant to deceptively claim no 
interest in an item to be searched and then later attack the 
seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds. State v. Meyers, 21 Utah 2d 
110, 441 P.2d 510, 511 (1968). Others courts have found that a 
person has no standing to complain of the search of property he 
has voluntarily abandoned. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 
217, 240-41 (1960); State v. Mahone, 67 Haw. 644, 701 P.2d 171, 
175 (1985); Menefee v. State, 640 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Okl. Cr. 
1982); and State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245, 255-56 (Alaska 1980). 
The rationale being that abandoned property loses its privacy 
expectation. State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 857 (Utah 1978). 
Whether property is abandoned is primarily Ma question 
of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts 
done, and other objective facts. •' State v. Mahone, 701 P. 2d at 
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175, quoting, United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th 
Cir. 1973) limited by Hawkins v. State, 758 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 
Cr.App. 1988). Several courts have stated that a verbal 
disclaimer of ownership constitutes an abandonment of Fourth 
Amendment protection. See United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 
(9th Cir.1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); United States 
v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 
958 (1979); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 
1973) . 
Under the facts of the present case, it is 
uncontroverted that defendant verbally denied any knowledge or 
ownership of the seized property at the time of the search (S.T. 
6-7, 23). Defendant's denial of ownership demonstrates his 
intention to voluntarily abandon the briefcase and its 
incriminating contents. As a result, it is uncontested that 
defendant abandoned the property and thereby relinquished any 
privacy interest he may have had concerning the briefcase. 
This Court's recent ruling in State v. Holmes, 107 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 74, 78, n. 5 (Ct. App. 5/03/89), is distinguishable 
from and not controlling in the case at bar. In Holmes, as a 
policeman approached a car, the officer saw the defendant remove 
a roll of towels from her purse and attempt to stuff it down 
between the car seat and the console. The officer retrieved the 
towels which contained cocaine. Although the defendant denied 
the towels were hers, this Court noted that her mere disclaimer 
of ownership in the context of a police query was insufficient in 
itself to deny the defendant standing to challenge the legality 
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of search. In reaching its holding, this court relied on State 
v. Allen, 93 Wash.2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) where the 
evidence was found on the defendant's person and the Washington 
Supreme Court found that there was no question that the defendant 
had standing to contest the search. 
Holmes is not controlling in the present case because 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Meyers, 21 Utah 2d 110, 441 
?.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1968) has previously held that a disclaimer 
in response to police questioning is sufficient to waive a 
privacy right. This Court cannot disregard and circumvent Utah 
precedent by following Washington case law. Moreover, it is 
significant to note that standing pursuant to Washington law is 
considerably different than standing according to Utah law. For 
example, Washington accords automatic standing if possession is 
an element of the crime and if the defendant was in possession of 
the item at the time it was seized. See State v. Goodman, 42 
Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1985). Utah does not 
recognize automatic standing. Also, the Washington court relied 
on Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which the United 
States Supreme Court in Rakas explicitly rejected as the test for 
standing. Since the Utah Supreme Court follows Rakas, this Court 
was misguided to rely on Allen. 
Further, the factual circumstanceis presented in the 
Holmes and Allen cases differ significantly from the present 
case. In Holmes and Allen, the seized property was obviously 
that of the defendant and the police took advantage of the 
disclaimer to deny the defendant standing to challenge the 
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search. In the case at bar, it was not obvious that the 
briefcase belonged to the defendant. Defendant denied ownership 
in the vehicle and the briefcase (T. 161-62). There was no 
vehicle registration to prove the truth or falsity of defendant's 
disclaimer (S.T. 11). Since it was not obvious that defendant 
was the owner of the briefcase and the officer's only information 
was defendant's disclaimer of ownership, defendant should not 
benefit from his false statement by now challenging the search 
which was based on his false representation. 
Finally, in order to have standing to challenge an 
alleged unlawful search, a defendant must have asserted at least 
a "claimed right [of] possession" in the item prior to the 
search. Constantino, 732 P.2d at 127. Having failed to assert a 
claim in the trunk or briefcase at the time of the search, 
defendant lacks standing to object to the search. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH. 
Even assuming defendant has standing to challenge the 
search, defendant's claim should be disregarded because the trial 
court properly found that defendant voluntarily consented to the 
warrantless search. 
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, this 
Court will not set aside a trial court's finding unless it is 
••clearly erroneous" giving due deference to the court's 
determination of the credibility of the witnesses State v. Kelly, 
92 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (S. Ct. 9/23/88), citing State v. Ashe, 
745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 
14-
P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1988) On Rehearing 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 
(S.Ct. 5/30/89); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The definition of 
"clearly erroneous" was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court from 
the parallel Federal Rules of Procedure. State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In 
interpreting the Federal Rules, the United State Supreme Court in 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948) defined "clearly erroneous" as follows: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 
although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed. 
Id. quoted in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. 
In Walker, the Utah Supreme Court further clarified the 
standard of review by referring to Wright & Miller as follows: 
The appellate court . . . does not 
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The 
mere fact that on the same evidence the 
appellate court might have reached a 
different result does not justify it in 
setting the findings aside. It may regard a 
finding as clearly erroneous only if the 
finding is without adequate evidentiary 
support or induced by an erroneous view of 
the law. 
Walker, at 193, quoting, Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, S 2585 (1971). In sum, this court will 
not set aside a trial court's finding of voluntary consent to 
search unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. Walker, at 193; State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
In determining whether an accused's consent to search 
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was given voluntarily, the Utah Supreme Court adheres to the 
"totality of circumstances*1 standard as set forth in Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that voluntary consent to search 
is an exception to the general search warrant and probable cause 
requirements, Ld. The Court adopted the "totality of the 
circumstances" test in determining whether consent was given 
voluntarily. Ld. at 226. Some of the factors against 
voluntariness may be the accused's youth, lack of education, low 
intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his 
constitutional rights, the length of detention, repeated 
questioning, or the use of threats, duress, promises or other 
coercion. I^d* In determining if a consent to search was 
voluntarily given, a court may consider the factual circumstances 
surrounding the consent, assess the psychological impact on the 
accused, and evaluate the legal significance of how the accused 
reacted. Id. 
Applying the voluntariness test to the present facts, 
the record clearly indicates that defendant consented to the 
search of the vehicle he was driving. Defendant had been legally 
stopped on the side of an interstate highway for a speeding 
violation (T. 153-54). The stopped occurred at 10:00 o'clock in 
the morning (T. 155). Defendant, who was on parole, was well 
acquainted with the law having been convicted of two prior 
felonies (S.T. 9). When Officer Nester asked defendant if he 
would consent to a search of the trunk, defendant replied, "Go 
ahead, you can search the trunk" (S.T. 22). Defendant again 
•16-
consented to the search of the briefcase (S.T. 23). Defendant's 
verbal consent to search was witnessed by the other occupants of 
the vehicle which corroborated the officer's story (S.T. 98-99, 
106, 109). 
Defendant argues that even if he gave consent, it was 
given involuntarily as a result of duress or coercion. In State 
v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth five factors which may show a lack of duress or 
coercion: 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to 
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a 
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner of vehicle; and 5) the absence of 
deception or trick on the part of the 
officer. 
jld. at 106. 
In the case at bar, there is no evidence that coercion 
or duress was placed upon defendant or anyone else to consent to 
the search. When the officer asked defendant for permission to 
search the trunk, defendant was not in custody. Although 
defendant was not free to leave, the atmosphere of detention at 
the scene had none of the coercive aspects of questioning at a 
police station. Moreover, Nester did not claim any authority to 
search or deceive defendant into thinking he had a search warrant 
or the right to search the trunk. In fact, Nester had just 
finished searching the interior of the car pursuant a lawful 
search for open beer bottles (T. 159). By asking permission to 
search the trunk, Nester indicated to defendant that his 
authority to search did not extend to the trunk without 
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defendant's permission. Although two other officers were at the 
scene, Sergeant Pitsor did not arrive until after the consent had 
been given (T. 199). Thus, the presence of additional officers 
did not create an undue show of authority. 
When Officer Nester requested permission to search, he 
simply asked if he could search the trunk and the briefcase to 
which defendant replied, "sure, go ahead" (T. 160, 161). 
Defendant in fact cooperated with the officer by retrieving the 
keys from the ignition and opening the trunk (T. 160). Moreover, 
the record is completely devoid of any evidence of a show or 
threat of force by the officer. 
Defendant makes several miscellaneous arguments which, 
upon closer scrutiny, are irrelevant to the voluntariness of his 
consent to search. He argues that he knew the stolen jewelry was 
in the trunk and therefore it would have been illogical for him 
to consent in the absence of duress or coercion. However, 
defendant may have purposefully cooperated with the police to 
appear unknowing and consented to the search so as to avoid 
further suspicion. Also, the fact that Officer Nester may have 
had other grounds whereby he could have legally searched the 
trunk is not dispositive of the issue of consent. Moreover, 
since a written consent form is not required to establish a 
voluntary consent search, it is not significant that defendant 
did not sign or read a search consent form. Finally, the fact 
that a written consent form was used for a subsequent search of a 
different vehicle of another party neither adds nor detracts from 
the voluntariness of defendant's consent. 
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Under the totality of the circumstances test, and 
giving due deference to the trial court's assessment of the 
credibility of the witnesses, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the search of the vehicle was 
j 
performed pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent. Thus, this 
court should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests that 
defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
lis U?' DATED thi  LCy day of July, 1989. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Citation of Supplemental Authorities on 
State v. Scott, Case No. 880182-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, respondent wishes to cite supplemental authorities in 
support of the Brief of Respondent. This Court's recent decision 
in State v. Grueber, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Ct. App. June 3, 
1989) and the California Court of Appeals decision in People v. 
Dasilva, 207 Cal.App.3d 43, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563 (Ct. App. 1989) are 
relevant to the issues discussed in Point I of the Brief of 
Respondent. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Very truly yours, 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Section 
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